through the danger zone. Thus the advance to armed neutrality proposed by the President on 26th February was definitely made. The further inevitable step to open hostilities was merely a matter of time-dependent upon Wilson's choice of the decisive 'overt act for which he had declared he would wait The atmosphere during those days is reflected in the despatches which the British Government received from its Washington Embassy. On 21st March, the following cable was received :-

" Naval Attache- sent for last night by Beverley*
who told him that while Cabinet is for war and is
trying to force issue Wilson is rather *Wilson still* hesitating about *fa* attitude the new fcnfato Congress may adopt. Beverley is loth
t. MI ! *° * President as if he goes wrong
he will lose influence with him. Briefly his whole conversation was to the effect that they are uncertain of Congress. and on the other hand are anxious about danger of cooling down of public feeling.
This would appear another example of the hesitation which throughout has marked the President's actions but every indication shows that war is inevitable.

Two or three days earlier, three American ships had been sunk within 24 hours and 15 lives lo House confirms in his Memoirs that at this time the American Cabinet was eager for a declaration of war without further delay, but that the

President could not be induced to make up his mind. But on aist March he determined to summon a special session of Congress for and April in order to agree on future policy. On 2rd March a letter was written by one

Colonel House.